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NEGOTIABILITY AND THE RENVOI DOCTRINE
A recent English case decides two interesting and very important
questions in the Conflict of Laws. A, of Liverpool, bought cotton
from B in the United States, who drew a bill of exchange on A, which
contained in the margin the date of the sale contract and a reference
to the quality of the cotton and in the body of the document the words
"value received and charge the same to account of R.. bales of
cotton." C, in New York, in good faith purchased the draft with
what purported to be the bill of lading of the cotton attached, and
sent the documents to A, who accepted the draft and paid it at
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maturity. The bill of lading was a forgery and no cotton had been
shipped. On discovery of the fraud, A brought an action in the
District Court of the United States for the Southern District of New
York to recover back from C the amount of the money paid. The
trial court, treating the question as one of American law, rendered
judgment in A's favor. The judgment was reversed by the Circuit
Court of Appeals1 and a new trial ordered on the ground that the
case was governed by English law and that the trial judge had dis-
regarded the evidence before him of what the English law was. In
order to avoid the necessity of taking evidence of expert witnesses
concerning English law at the new trial, C decided to obtain a declara-
tory judgment of the English courts upon the English law applicable.
2
The King's Bench Division held that the judgment of the American
court was binding upon the parties in England, but that according to
English law the rights of the parties depended upon American law.
It was held, therefore, that A was entitled to recover the money, paid.
Guaranty Trust Co. of New York v. Hannay & Co. [1918 ] i K. B. 43.
I
It is evident at the outset that the English court sanctions the renvos
doctrine in the Conflict of Laws. It purports to decide the case
according to English law as directed by the judgment of the United
States Circuit Court of Appeals, but it decides it actually according
to American law. The term "English law" to which the American
judgment referred may have one of two meanings. It may mean the
internal law of England relating to negotiable in'struments, foreign
bills of lading, etc., exclusive of the English rules of the Conflict of
Laws, or it may mean the English law as a whole, inclusive of its rules
of the Conflict of Laws. The renvoi doctrine, so-called, signifies that
the foreign law, to which the rules of the Conflict of Laws of the
forum refer the controversy, is understood in the latter sense. The
King's Bench Division accepts the interpretation last mentioned,
apparently without being aware that in so doing it takes sides with
rispect to one of the most disputed problems in the Conflict of Laws.
3
Indeed, it accepts the renvoi doctrine in its most extensive form-
' Guaranty Trust Company of New York v. Hannay et al. (1913, C. C. A. 2d)
210 Fed. 8io.
'For a discussion of the English procedure permitting merely declaratory
judgments, see article by Prof. Borchard to appear in the following number.
'For a discussion of the problem, see Lorenzen, The Renvoi Theory and the
Application of Foreign Law (igio) 10 COLUMBIA L. REv. i9o, 327, and The
Renvoi Doctrine in the Conflict of Laws-Meaning of "The Law of a Country"
(1918) 27 YALE- LAw JoulrNA., 5og; Schreiber, The Doctrine of the Renvoi in
Anglo-American Law (1918) 31 HAv. L. REv. 523. A bibliography of the sub-
ject may be found in 27 YALP. LAw JouRNArl, pp. 53z-534.
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that of "forward reference." In applying it to the validity and
obligation of contracts, as distinguished from capacity and matters
of form, it goes beyond any English4 or Continental5 court in the
matter. Practical considerations of a very decisive character speak
against the adoption of the renvoi doctrine in any form.6 Its applica-
tion to contracts in general is well-nigh impossible. Hence it is
recognized by even the most ardent advocates of the doctrine that it
should not be extended to commercial contracts.7 All questions of
the Conflict of Laws should be settled, save in a few exceptional
cases,8 by the rules of the Conflict of Laws of the forum, and the
foreign law which these rules adopt should be understood to be
the foreign law on the ultimate question to be determined, and not the
foreign rules of the Conflict of Laws.
II
How did the English court reach the conclusion that American law
was applicable? It was conceded in the case that the acceptor could
recover his money if the draft was non-negotiable.9 And it was found
that according to the American law of Bills and Notes the instru-
ment paid was a mere conditional order, but that, if it were governed
wholly by the English law of Bills and Notes, it would be a negotiable
draft. The question therefore arose whether, as regards the English
acceptor, the law of England or that of the United States should
decide the negotiability of the instrument. The English court
answered this question by reference to the Conflict of Laws provisions
of the English Bills of Exchange Act. Section 72 of that Act pro-
vides as follows:
"(i) The validity of a bill as regards requisites in form is deter-
mined by the law of the place of issue ...
"Provided that .. . (b) Where a bill, issued out of the United
Kingdom, conforms, as regards requisites in form, to the law of the
United Kingdom, it may, for the purpose of enforcing payment
' (19io) io COLUmBIA L REv. 332, et seq.; (1918) 31 HARV. L. RMv. 537, et seq.
'(igio) 1o COLUmBiA I REv. 192-193.
* (1910) 70 COLUMBIA L. REv. 205-206; (I918) 27 YAmE LAw JouR-AL, 524,
et seq.
'Although the German code has accepted the renvoi doctrine, the consensus
of German juristic opinion appears to have been opposed to the application of
the doctrine to contracts in general. See 4 Verfiandlungen des Z4 Deutschen
Juristentages, 76.
* Concerning such exceptions, see (1g18) 27 YALE LAW JouRNAL, 529, et seq.
"If there had been a difference between the English and American law on
this point, the English law would probably have controlled, even though the
question arose in the United States, because the matter relates to the perform-
ance of the contract.
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thereof, be treated as valid between all persons who negotiate, hold,
or become parties to it in the United Kingdom."
These provisions apparently support the proposition that if the
instrument is negotiable under the law of the place of its issue it will
be deemed so with respect to all parties, but if it is non-negotiable
according to such law, it may be negotiable, nevertheless, as between
persons who hold or become parties to it in the United Kingdom. The
conditions required by proviso (b) of the English Act are, however,
(i) that the bill shall conform to the law of the United Kingdom as
regards requisites of form; (2) that the suit shall be "for the pur-
pose of enforcing payment thereof"; (3) that it arise between persons
who negotiate, hold, or become parties to it in the United Kingdom.
The instant case appears to be the first involving an interpretation
of this proviso of the English Act. Had the case turned wholly on
the second of the above conditions, that is, had both parties to the
suit become parties to the instrument in England, an interesting
question might have arisen in determining whether the instrument was
to be considered as negotiable for the purpose of enforcing payment
against the acceptor even though all the facts were known, but non-
negotiable when the suit was the other way, so that the acceptor,
having' paid voluntarily in ignorance of the facts, could at once
recover back what he had paid. It seems absurd to say that a party
can, on a given state of facts, recover back money paid, although,
if he had not already paid it, he could now on the same state of facts
be compelled by stiit to pay. In the actual case, however, it is not
quite clear whether the second or the third condition was held con-
trolling. The court admits that if the acceptor had refused to pay
an English holder, suit might have been maintained on the acceptance.
But the question was, says the court, "Was this draft a conditional
order when the plaintiffs bought it, and when they presented it for
acceptance to the defendants, and they accepted it? This question
is untouched by the proviso." It is true that the plaintiff, C, did
not become a party to the instrument in the United Kingdom, but C
transmitted it to a bank in Liverpool to be presented there to A for
acceptance, and after acceptance C negotiated it in England, and pay-
ment was finally made to a London bank, as the ultimate holder. It
would seem therefore that C might have been held within the descrip-
tion of "persons who negotiate, hold, or become parties to [an instru-
ment] in the United Kingdom."
Enough has been said to show the difficulties of construing the
proviso of the English Act and to indicate a doubt whether, purely as
a question of construction, the decision of the King's Bench Division
was correct. It would have been better if the proviso in the English
Act had followed the example of either the Argentine Commercial
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Code' ° or the German Bills of Exchange Law,-1 and simply imposed
general liability on any person becoming a party to the instrument
in the United Kingdom.
The proviso being out of the case, the English court proceeded to
apply the general Conflict of Laws provision of subsection (i) of
Section 72 of the English Act. The case illustrates in a most strik-
ing manner the strange consequences to which the recognition of the
renvoi doctrine in the Conflict of Laws may lead. An American
appellate court decides that the lower court erred in applying
American law to determine the negotiability of an instrument with
respect to an acceptor, and that this question is to be determined
according to English law. The judgment is regarded as binding
upon the parties in an English court. Suit is brought thereupon in
England to get a decision on the English law, and behold, it is gravely
answered that American law governs! One almost wonders why the
English court did not go one step further. If "English law" includes
English Conflict of Laws, why does not "American law" include
American Conflict of Laws? Having found, then, that the "English
law" invoked by the American court "throws the parties back upon
American law," why did not the English court hold, under the decision
of the American court, recognized as binding on the parties, that
"American law" would "throw the parties back upon English
law?" And so the game of battledore and shuttlecock might con-
tinue indefinitely.
Or, if it be said that the renvoi principle can be applied but once
in a single controversy, it is interesting to speculate on what law of
Bills and Notes the English court would have applied, had the suit
been brought in England in the first instance. Apparently it would
have been held, under the Bills of Exchange Act, that American law
governed. Would the renvoi then have been invoked to apply the
American doctrine of Conflict of Laws and "throw the parties back
upon English law ?" If so, the only reason for reaching a different
result in this case, and finally applying American Bills and Notes
law, would seem to be that in this case an American court had first
held, in a decision binding on the parties, that English law applied!
"The Argentine Code applies only to endorsers. It reads as follows:"Nevertheless, if the statements made in a foreign bill of exchange are suffi-cient according to the laws of the Republic, the circumstance that they aredefective according to foreign laws cannot give rise to defences against endorse-
ments afterwards added in the Republic." Art. 738.
'The German Code provision refers to acceptors as well as to endorsers.It provides as follows: "If, however, the statements inserted abroad on thebill satisfy the requirements of the inland law, no objection can be taken against
the legal liability incurred by statements subsequently made within the Empire(Inland) on the ground that the statements made abroad do not satisfy the
foreign law." Art 83.
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It is to be remembered, however, that the real question is whether
the English court correctly interpreted the American decision, and
that the American court will have the last word. When the Circuit
Court of Appeals referred the parties to English law, did it mean
English Bills and Notes law only, or English Conflict of Laws? The
opinion would seem to indicate the former. The evidence which the
lower federal court disregarded seems to have related solely to the
law of Bills and Notes, as distinguished from Conflict of Laws. If
this is what the Circuit Court of Appeals meant, then its decision
conclusively determined between the parties all questions of Conflict
of Laws involved, and the only question left open was what the Eng-
lish law of Bills and Notes might ultimately be found to be. The
English court discussed this question and held that under English
Bills and Notes law the acceptor would be bound and could not
recover back. So much of the decision, if it stands unreversed in
England, would presumably be binding on the parties in subsequent
proceedings in the American courts. The rest of the English decision
the American courts are at liberty to disregard, as at variance with
the decision already rendered by the Circuit Court of Appeals between
the same parties on the question of Conflict of Laws, and resulting
only from a misinterpretation of that decision by the English court.
It is to be hoped that the New York federal courts will hold fast
to the distinction between questions of Conflict of Laws and ques-
tions of Bills and Notes, and will not be misled by any errors of
the English courts into giving their sanction to this astonishing and
unfortunate extension of the renvoi doctrine. To follow the English
courts into that maze can lead only to'hopeless confusion in our com-
mercial law.
As this is written, we note a report in a New York newspaper for
May 3oth to the effect that the English decision has been reversed by
the Court of Appeals. The grounds of reversal are not stated, but
may be awaited with interest.
ni
A few words may be added in regard to the American rule of Con-
flict of Laws in respect to the negotiability of instruments, which was
applied by the Circuit Court of Appeals in the case under discussion.
Most American courts decide the question in accordance with the
general rule that the law of the place of payment governs the validity
and obligation of contracts. 12 As each endorsement or acceptance on
a bill or note is regarded as a separate contract governed by" the law
"Strawberry Point Bank v. Lee (i898) 117 Mich. 122, 75 N. W. 444; Barger
v. Farnham (i9o2) 130 Mich. 487, 9o N. W. 281; Freeman's Bank v. Ruckman
(i86o, Va.) 16 Gratt 126.
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of the place of its performance, and this place of performance is not
necessarily the same for all parties, the conclusion has been drawn
that the negotiability of the instrument should be determined with
respect to each party by the law governing his contract. 3 The United
States Circuit Court of Appeals held therefore, upon the basis of the
American decisions, that the liability of the English acceptor in
the present case was controlled by English law. It is submitted,
however, that the principle on which the American courts proceed
is unsound, and that the provisions of the English Bills of Exchange
Act approach more nearly to the correct solution of the problem.
Bills of exchange cannot be regarded from a purely local point of
view. They have international functions to perform, and they can-
not serve this purpose unless the status as negotiable documents
which the law at the time of their issue has conferred upon them is
recognized in all countries with respect to all parties. Whether the
governing law should be the law of the place where the original
instrument was issued, that is, the law of the place where it was
delivered, or whether it should be controlled by the law of the place
where the principal contract was to be performed, need not be
investigated here, although it would seem reasonably clear that in
the absence of an international agreement adopting the law of the
place of payment of the instrument as the law governing the rights
and obligations of all parties, the law of the place of issue should
be given the preference.
It does not follow, of course, that if the original instrument is non-
negotiable under the law applicable at the time of its creation, a
person accepting or endorsing the instrument in a different state or
country might not justly be held in the courts of that state or country
as an acceptor or endorser of a negotiable instrument. If the original
instrument would have been regarded as negotiable had it been
executed in the state where the person in question becomes a party
to the instrument, there is no reason why on grounds of local policy
aiming to protect purchasers of foreign bills of exchange the local
acceptor should not be deemed by his own courts to have assumed
liability on that basis.14
As regards an endorser, such a result may be derived without
express legislation from his implied warranty that at the time of the
endorsement the instrument is an existing bill or note. The endorsee,
who is not chargeable with knowledge of foreign law, may well claim
that the endorser's warranty should protect him against a non-
validity arising from foreign law. An acceptor, on the other hand,
Syatt v. Bank of Kentucky (1871, Ky.) 8 Bush. i93; Mackintosh v. Gibbs
(xgi) 81 N. 3. L. 577, 8o AtL 554; Nichols v. Porter (1867) 2 W. Va. 13.
1" See Lorenzen, The Rules of the Conflict of Laws Applicable to Bills and
Notes (i917) i MINN. L. REv. 328-332.
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does not warrant the validity of the instrument and herce would not
be estopped, without specific legislation to that effect, to set up the
invalidity of the original instrument under a foreign law. In a
number of foreign countries both the endorser and the acceptor are
made liable under the above circumstances by express legislation."
While the foregoing argument would lead to the conclusion that,
in a case like the instant cases, the American courts should on
principle apply American law to determine the rights of all parties,
this criticism of the American decision should not obscure the
fact that it was not only in accord with the great weight of American
authority, but was a binding adjudication between the parties.
Rightly or wrongly, it settled the rule for this case that English law
was to apply, and no question of its theoretical soundness will justify
the English court in "throwing the parties back on American law."
AMENDMENTS FROM EQUITY TO LAW AND THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
Looked at from different viewpoints a given set of facts may be
regarded as giving rise to different causes of action. A trespassory
taking and carrying away of another's chattel, for example, may be
looked at as an unlawful invasion of another's possession, for which
the common law remedy is an action of trespass; it may, on the other
hand, be viewed as an assertion of that kind of unlawful dominion
over another's property which we call a conversion, for which the
common law action is trover.1 Again, according to many authorities, it
may be treated (where the chattel is permanently retained by the tort
feasor) as resulting in an unjust enrichment for which an action of
indebitatus assumpsit for goods sold and delivered will lie.2 If to the
trespassory taking and retention there be added the additional fact
that the chattel has been sold by the tort feasor, it is universally held
that an action for money had and received may be brought. In other
cases either trespass for injury to person or property or trespass on
the case for negligence resulting in injury to person or property will
lie-e. g., where one negligently drives his carriage against the person
or property of another.1 In still others, the injured person has his
choice between legal and equitable actions. An example of the latter
"German Bills of Exchange Law, art. 85; Argentine Commercial Code, art.
738. See also English Bills of Exchange Act, sec. 72, subsection (i),
proviso (b); discussed in the text
'Basset v. Maynard (i6oi, Q. B.) Cro. Eliz. 8ig, is one of the early cases
so holding; see also i Rolle, Abr., 1o5 (M) pl. 5.
'One of the best discussions of the problem involved is found in the opinion
in Braithwaite v. Akin (893) 3 N. D. 365, 56 N. W. i33.
* Williams v. Holland (833, C. B.) io Bing. 112.
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kind is found where property has been obtained by means of fraud.
Here if the property conveyed be real estate, it may be recovered by
bill in equity; on the other hand, the injured party has his option to
retain what he received from the defendant and sue at law for
damages in an action for deceit
In cases of this kind the question arises whether commencing an
action in which one of two or more alternative remedies is asked will
stop the running of the statute of limitations against the other
remedies, at least to the extent that the plaintiff may amend his state-
ment of claim so as to shift to one of the other points of view with-
out being subject to defeat by a plea of the statute. This problem is
involved in the recent case of Friederichsen v. Renard (1918, U. S.)
38 Sup. Ct. 45o. The petitioner in that case filed a bil in equity in
the United States District Court for the District of Nebraska, asking
for the cancellation of a deed to land, on the ground that the defend-
ants had obtained the same by fraudulent representations as to land
which the petitioner took in exchange. The master to whom the
case was referred reported that the plaintiff had lost the right to
equitable relief because, after learning of the fraud, he had cut a
quantity of timber on the land received from the defendants. The
case was then, pursuant to equity rule 22, transferred to the law side
of the court, and the plaintiff was permitted to file an amended
petition praying for a judgment at law for damages for deceit. To
the amended petition the defendants pleaded the Nebraska four year
statute of limitations. The District Court held that the cause of
action stated in the amended petition was barred by the statute. This
judgment, affirmed by the Circuit Court of Appeals, was unanimously
reversed by the United States Supreme Court, on the ground that
the causes of action stated in the original petition and in the amended
petition were but different aspects of one transaction, and that, for
the purpose of preventing the statute of limitations from continuing
to run against them, suit on one was suit on both.
The result reached by the learned court seems equally sensible and
sound, but it departs very clearly from older traditions. Obviously,
so long as law and equity were administered by separate tribunals, the
petitioner in the principal case would have been unable to meet suc-
cessfully the plea of the statute when, after losing in the equitable
proceeding, he began the suit at law. Now that one tribunal
administers both law and equity, however, the problem should be
treated as not different from that in cases in which the plaintiff seeks
to amend from one common law form of action to another. In cases
of the latter kind the various jurisdictions have rules of varying
strictness and liberality. In some an amendment which seeks to shift
from one common law form to another, as from trespass to case or
case to trespass, while permissible as an amendment, is regarded as
1054
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substantially beginning a new action and so subject to a plea of the
statute of limitations, even though it is apparent that the same general
transaction is involved.' Other courts take a more sensible and
liberal view, similar to that in the principal case, and do not allow
the statute to defeat an honest litigant who has been trying to enforce
his rights, but who has been badly advised by his lawyer as to the
precise remedy open to him.5 The question is, it seems clear, purely
one- of the fair construction to be given to the statute of limitations,
i. e., what may fairly be called starting suit within the meaning of the
statute so as to give the defendant fair notice of the nature of the
plaintiff's claim? In certain jurisdictions-fortunately few in num-
ber-a most narrow and illiberal view prevails, viz., that a declaration
which omits absolutely an essential allegation may not, after the statute
has run, be amended to insert the missing allegation, even though no
attempt is made to change the form of action. The reason given for
this illiberal view is that the original declaration was defective in
substance and so in legal effect equivalent to no declaration at all.
Decisions of this kind cannot be supported upon any ground of policy
or fair dealing. The rules which determine what allegations must go
into a declaration or statement of claim are necessarily in many
respects arbitrary, and a litigant ought not to lose his cause of action
because his attorney has made an error of the kind in question. For
this reason the rule in most jurisdictions is contrary to that estab-
lished by the courts just referred to.' The just rule would seem to
be that where there has been a fair and honest attempt within the
statutory period to enforce the rights growing out of the transaction
in question, a plea of the statute should not be permitted to bar the
plaintiff from shifting to a different remedy, although the result may
be to change from one form of action to another, or even from equity
to law or law to equity. It is indeed fortunate that the Supreme
Court has added the weight of its great authority upon the side of
justice and common sense.
FOREIGN INHERITANCE TAXES AS DEDUCTIBLE ADMINISTRATION
EXPENSES
The increasingly prevalent mode of taxation commonly known as
the inheritance tax is usually based upon the theory that the tax is
laid upon the legal privilege of the legatee, devisee or heir to acquire
property of the decedent by will or by descent.' The measure of the
'Hess v. Birmingham Ry. Co. (i9o6) 149 Ala. 499, 42 So. 595.
'Reynolds v. Missouri, K. & T. R. R. Co. (r917, Mass.) 117 N. . 913.
'Foster v. St. Luke's Hospital (igoi) 19i Ill. 94, 6o N. E. 803.
'McLaughlin v. West End St. Ry. Co. (i9o4) 186 Mass. 150, 71 N. E. 317.
'While the tax is commonly described as a tax on the privilege of succes-
sion, it is believed to be more strictly accurate to consider it a tax on the
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tax is commonly the value of the property so acquired as of the time
of death of the testator or the intestate decedent. Consequently the
tax is determined by the value of the beneficiary's "net succession,"
that is, the property which remains for distribution to him after pay-
ment of debts and expenses of administration.2  But just what items
may properly be included as expenses of administration is a matter
on which the courts have frequently reached different conclusions.
In Corbin v. Townshend (1918, Conn.) 103 At. 647, the Supreme
Court of Connecticut has rendered a decision of first impression
holding that the estate tax payable under the federal act, and also
inheritance taxes payable under the statutes of various states, are
expenses of administration properly deductible in determining the net
estate subject to the Connecticut inheritance tax of a testatrix resident
in Connecticut.
The Connecticut tax is of the sort above mentioned-a succession
tax or "death duty" prescribed in respect to the beneficial interest
passing by force of Connecticut law to the beneficiaries of the
decedent, and measured by the value of the property so passing,3
i. e., by the value of the distributive share as of the time of the
exercise of such privilege, i. e., on the passing of the property. When a legatee
renounces his legacy, no tax in respect to such legacy is collectible. Matter of
Wolfe (igo3, N. Y.) 89 App. Div. 349, 85 N. Y. Supp. 949, affd. 179 N. Y. 599,
72 N. M_ 1152; Estate of Stone (i9o6) 132 Iowa, 136, io9 N. W. 455.
Sometimes the tax appears to be considered as a tax upon the privilege
of the decedent to transmit rather than upon the privilege of the beneficiary
to acquire. In Minot v. Winthrop (i894) 162 Mass. 113, 38 N. . 512
Field, C. J., said: "But the right or privilege taxed can perhaps be regarded
either as the right or privilege of the owner to transmit it on his death, by
will or descent, to certain persons, or as the right or privilege of these persons
to receive the property." See also United States v. Perkins (1895) i63. U S.
625, 628, I6 Sup. Ct io73. In Nettleton's Appeal (i9o3) 76 Conn. 235, 56
At. 565, Hamersley, J., said:
"Nor is it material to the essence of the tax at what time it is ascertained
and collected during the passage of the property, through the channel of the
law, from the dead to the living; whether the property is tapped as it falls
from the lifeless hand, or midway in its course, or as it passes into the grip
of the new owner; whether it is called a probate, a succession, or a legacy
tax. Such nomenclature is convenient; its distinctions may be important for
clear discussion of the policy of death duties and the mode of using this
form of taxation; and an accurate conception of them may serve to throw
light upon the actual intent of the legislature, when language of doubtful mean-
ing is used, in determining the amount and manner of enforcing the tax."
'Sometimes the deduction of debts and expenses of administration from the
appraised value of the estate is expressly provided for statute, as in the
present Connecticut law. Acts 1915, ch. 332, sec. 5. In other cases the courts
have recognized the doctrine without express statutory declaration. See
Gallup's Appeal (19o4) 76 Conn. 617, 62o; 57 At& 6gg, 7oo; Estate of Kennedy
(1910) 157 Cal. 517, io8 Pac. 28o; Ross, Inheritance Taxation, sec. 270,
"This was the construction placed upon the former statute. See Hopkin,'
Appeal (i9o5) 77 Conn. 644, 649; 6o AtI. 657, 659. The present law (Acts 1915,
ch. 332) expressly provides:
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decedent's death and not by the net gain to the estate of the dis-
tributee. The latter is less than the former by the amount of the
Connecticut inheritance tax.
I. THE FEDERAL TAX
The federal tax must likewise be construed as a tax in the nature
of a death duty, for if it were a direct tax upon the property it would
be unconstitutional., Moreover, it is expressly laid upon the "trans-
fer" of the estate. But unlike the Connecticut tax or the former
federal inheritance tax it is levied upon the estate as an entity, and
is paid by and out of the estate, instead of by the beneficiaries out
of their shares." With reference to the federal tax the Connecticut
court said:
"The federal act of 1916 imposes a tax payable out of the estate
before distribution, thus differing from the federal inheritance, tax
of 1898, payable by the individual beneficiaries. It is not a tax upon
specific legacies, nor upoi residuary legatees. It is taken from the
net estate 'before the distributive shares are determined rather than
off the distributive shares.' Its payment diminishes pro tanto the
share of each beneficiary. The executor or administrator must pay
the tax out of the estate before the shares of the legatees are ascer-
tained. It is an obligation against the estate and payable like any
expense which, falls under the head of administration expenses. The
tax paid is no part of the estate at the time of distribution; it has
passed from the estate and the share of the beneficiaries is diminished
by just so much . . .
"See. 3. All property owned by any resident... which shall pass by will
or by the provisions of the general statutes relating to the distribution of
intestate estates,... shall be liable to a tax as hereinafter provided.
"Sec. 5. The net estate for taxation purposes shall be ascertained by add-
ing to the appraised value of the inventoried estate [certain gains] and
deducting therefrom the amount of claims paid, all funeral expenses and
expenses of administration, . .. and losses incurred during the settlement of
the estate in the reduction of choses in action to possession..."
The opinion in the principal case states that the Act is a re-enactment of the
provisions of the former statute in the light of their settled construction.
'See Knowlton v. Moore (ipoo) 178 U. S. 41, 20 Sup. Ct. 747.
'The Revenue Act of Sept. 8, i916 (ch. 463), as amended March 3, 1917
(ch. i5q), imposes a tax (see. 2oi) "upon the transfer of the net estate of
every decedent" dying after the passage of the Act. It is based upon the
amount of the entire estate, less an exemption of $50,ooo and certain specified
deductions (sec. 2o3), without regard to the value of the shares of the several
beneficiaries or the degrees of their relationship to the decedent. The intent
of the Act is expressed (sec. 208) to be that "so far as is practicable and
unless otherwise directed by the will of the decedent the tax shall be paid
out of the estate before its distribution." U. S. Comp. St. 1I16, sec. 6336Y2,
a-m, 39 Stat. 777, 1002.
In (1917) 3 Am. BAR Asst. JouR., 178, it is said: "The Federal Estate Act
was carefully drawn so that it would not duplicate the inheritance taxes of the
states, but would come off the net estate before the distributive shares were




"Any expense arising by operation of law which is a charge against
or must be paid out of the estate is an administration expense within
the meaning of this term as used in section 5 of the [Connecticut]
Act of 1915.
"The payment of the federal tax is an expense of the estate, as
much so as any expense of administration."
It is submitted that this reasoning and the result to which it leads
are sound. A similar decision was recently rendered in Minnesota,8
but several lower New York courts have decided otherwise.
7
II. TAXES LEVIED BY OTHER STATES
The court's- decision that inheritance taxes paid other states are
likewise deductible is based upon the premise that such taxes "are
upon the same basis as the federal tax; they must be paid before the
executor or administrator can reduce the bonds or stock to possession."
"These cannot be transferred until the state tax is paid and the value
of the security so transferred is reduced by the amount of the tax
which the executor or administrator has had to pay." But is this
premise sound? The federal tax, as the court has indicated, is
payable out of the estate as a whole before the distributive shares
are determined, but this is not usually the case in respect to state
inheritance taxes. They are commonly levied upon the succession of
.the individual distributive shares and chargeable against these shares,
not imposed upon and paid by the estate as a whole before the dis-
tributive shares are determined. Take, by way of illustration, the
tax of Wisconsin which was one of those involved in the principal
case. The theory of the Wisconsin tax is precisely the same as that
of Connecticut-a tax upon the privilege of succession, chargeable
against the distributive share passing to the individual beneficiary
and measured by the value of the property so passing before the tax
itself is taken off.8 In stressing the argument that the foreign tax
must be paid before the property can be-reduced to possession by the
executor, the court has evidently confused a provision for enforcing
the tax with the theoi-etical basis of the tax. This is the more strange
'State v. Probate Court 0i918, Minn.) i66 N. W. 125.
T In re Bierstadt's Estate (1917, Surr.) 163 N. Y. Supp. ii o4, affd. (1917)
178 App. Div. 836, 166 N. Y. Supp. 168; In re Sherman's Estate (i917, App.
Div.) 166 N. Y. Supp. ig. These decisions were much influenced by an earlier
case holding that the inheritance tax imposed by the War Revenue Act of
1898 was not deductible in determining the state tax. Matter of Gihon (19o2)
169 N. Y. 443, 62 N. E. 561. In Massachusetts an opposite conclusion had
been reached on the federal tax of i898. Hooper v. Shaw (19oo) 176 Mass.
,9o, 57 N. E. 361.
"Wis. Stat. 1911, secs. IO87-I to I087-24; Laws 1913, ch. 627. For cases
construing the statute, see Beals v. State (1909) 139 Wis. 545, 121 N. W. 347;
Estate of Bullen (igio) I43 Wis. 512, 128 N. W. xog; Estate of Smith (I915)
161 Wis. 588, r55 N. W. 1o9.
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because the Connecticut statute has a like clause, and in the words
of the court itself: "This [the Connecticut tax], by section IO, is
required to be paid by the administrator or executor from the funds
passing to the beneficiaries."
When, therefore, the foreign tax is levied upon and payable out of
the beneficiaries' shares, it is submitted that it cannot properly be
considered as an expense of administration and should no more be
deducted than should the Connecticut tax itself.9 Since the taxes of
both states are based upon the same theory, there is believed to be no
more reason for allowing the Wisconsin tax to be deducted to deter-
mine the Connecticut tax, than there would be for allowing the Con-
necticut tax to be deducted to determine the Wisconsin tax. The
impracticability of applying a rule which permits deductions by each
state is obvious.
Under the ruling of the Treasury Department state inheritance
taxes were for a time deducted in determining the federal estate tax,
but by a later ord&r this ruling was repealed.10
Another state inheritance tax involved in the principal case was
that of New Jersey. There is more reason for permitting the
deduction of this tax. It appears from the New Jersey decisions
that the inheritance tax of that state is not based upon the same
theory as are those of Connecticut and Wisconsin. As applied to
personal property of non-resident decedents, the New Jersey statute
has been construed as imposing a tax, not on the "singular succes-
sion" of the individual legatee or distributee, but on the "universal
succession" of the foreign executor or administrator.1 ' In other
words, the New Jersey court takes the view that all New Jersey law
does is to permit the property to vest in the executor or adminis-
trator and thus become a part of the general estate, the law of the
state of the decedent's domicile then prescribing how it shall pass to
the individual beneficiaries. Hence the only succession New Jersey
taxes is the succession of the executor or administrator to the New
Jersey personalty as a whole, not the passing of the several distribu-
tive shares to the beneficiaries. This construction of th New Jersey
tax may furnish a sound foundation for the argument that it is laid
upon the same basis as the federal tax and should be charged against
'The authorities from other states are not numerous and are conflicting.
Allowing deduction of foreign tax, see In re Van Bell's Estate (1917) 257 Pa.
155, 1oi Ati. 316; Bullard v. Redwood Library (914) 37 R. I. io7, 91 Atl. 30.
Disallowing deduction, see Matter of Penfold (915) 216 N. Y. 171, xio N. FE
499; Matter of Gihon (i9o2) 169 N. Y. 443, 62 N. E. 561.
"T. D. No. 2524, Sept. 1o, 1917.
'Carr v. Edwards (1913, Ct Err.) 84 N. J. L 667, 87 At. x3; Senff v.
Edwards (913, Sup. Ct) 85 N. J. L. 67, 88 At!. 1o26; Maxwell v. Edwards
(19z6, Sup. C.) 89 N. J. L. 446, 99 At. 138; Security Trust Co. v. Edwards
(1917, N. J. Ct Err.) ioi At. 384.
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the estate as a whole like a general expense of administration. There-
fore the deduction of the New Jersey tax as well as of the federal
tax is perhaps justified, but the Wisconsin tax cannot properly be so
treated for the reasons already indicated. The Connecticut court,
however, lumped all foreign state inheritance taxes together without
considering whether there was any difference in their character.
The apparent injustice of compelling a beneficiary to pay a duty
to two states on something he does not get, namely, the full amount
of his legacy or distributive share, no doubt inclines the court of the
decedent's domicile to permit the deduction of foreign inheritance
taxes. But this injustice is really the result of double taxation, of
allowing more than one state to levy a duty on the transfer of the
same property. It arises from the fact that the state of the decedent's
domicile, on the fiction mobilia sequuntur personam, asserts that it
grants the privilege of succession and so may tax it, while the other
state, the state of the situs, asserts that it has the power of controlling
how the property within its limits shall pass, that it grants the
privilege of allowing such property to pass in accordance with the
rules of the domicile, and therefore may tax this privilege.12 It is
not, however, the purpose of this discussion to enter upon a considera-
tion of the validity of the theories which lead to double taxation. It
is sufficient that the possible weakness of the court's opinion, in
classifying all foreign state inheritance taxes as similar to the federal
estate tax rather than analyzing them separately, has been pointed out,
in the hope that, if incorrect, the rule laid down by the court With
respect to deducting other state taxes may be corrected, or if correct,
that the reasons for the decision may be more clearly set forth in later
cases.
EFFICIENCY OR RESTRAINT OF TRADE
To develop a just, reasonable and practicable construction of the
Sherman Anti-Trust Act and apply it to the complicated facts of our
industrial and commercial structure is not a simple task. No rule of
thumb, no test capable of easy and instant application to -every
situation, could either work justice or secure the economic ends for
which the act was passed. The test of legality must first be expressed
in broad general terms, like the act itself; it must then be applied
with painstaking study and discrimination to the facts of each case,
bearing always in mind the clear general purpose of the act; the
border-line between lawful -and unlawful must be pricked out, point
'See Estate of Bullen (igio) 143 Wis. 512, 52o; 128 N. W. iog, ini. The
evil of double taxation has been partially removed by recent legislation in
Wisconsin. See Laws x913, ch. 627, sec. 2. For similar legislation in Massa-
chusetts, see Acts I9og, ch. 49o, Part iv., see. 3.
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by point, as specific cases arise. The "rule of reason," much mis-
understood and much criticised when it was first announced,' laid a
sound foundation for future development. It focussed attention on
the evils which the statute was intended to reach, which may be
summed up as the artificial creation of non-competitive conditions in
the sale of any product entering into interstate commerce, with the
resulting enhancement of prices, deterioration of product, reduction
of output, and other "characteristic evils of monopoly." An arrange-
ment or course of conduct, whatever its form, whose purpose or
necessary effect is predominantly or in any substantial degree to
produce these evils is forbidden. One not so intended and not so
resulting is outside the purview of the act.2
But however simply it may be stated, difficult questions of fact
must arise in the application of such a rule. The law aims to secure,
for the benefit of the consumer, vigorous and efficient competition.
But the chief spur to competition is the desire to get the largest
possible share of the business. Neither that object, nor even notable
success in its achievement, can be held unlawful without defeating
the very purpose of the statute. It is then a question of means.
But the means employed for efficient competition may closely resemble
those of monopoly. The union of two or three out of many compet-
ing concerns may be the best means to more effective competition.
The added strength so obtained may make the difference between
survival and failure in the war of competition. It seems clear that
under the "rule of reason" such a combination is not unlawful. But
the same combination as a step in a definite plan to eliminate competi-
tion and control the industry would be forbidden. And as intent
may often be judged only by acts, it is easy to see that as combina-
tion is carried a little further and a little further, difficult questions
of fact may arise in regard to the intent to be inferred. Nor is it
wholly a question of intent. Combination may reach the point where,
whatever its intent, the necessary practical result is to give the com-
bined organization a substantial domination of the market, to free it
from the checks and the spurs of effective competition. It can hardly
be doubted that combination carried to that point is, regardless of
its intent, within the reach of the law.
Again there can be no objection to the combination of two con-
'In Standard Oil Co. v. United States (IgII) 221 U. S. I, 31 Sup. Ct 502;
United States v. American Tobacco Co. (igr1) 22I U. S. io6, 31 Sup. Ct 632.
'The "rule of reason" means merely that the test is not formal, technical or
arbitrary, to be applied like a foot-rule, but calls for intelligence, reason and
common sense in its application. Some early misconceptions of its meaning
have been brushed away by later decisions. See for example, Thomsen v.




cerns, making and selling two lines of goods, not competitive but
supplementary. A maker of office desks and chairs and a maker of
filing cabinets may properly unite; to secure the advantages of offer-
ing a complete line of office furniture. Here is only increased
efficiency, and not restraint of trade. But here again, specific cases
will not always be clear cut. The principal lines of the two combin-
ing concerns may have been desks and filing cases respectively; but
both may have made chairs. Or one may have made flat-topped
desks and the other roll-topped. Are these competing or supplemen-
tary lines?
Add further to the supposed combination the lawful monopoly of
patent rights; large capital; remarkable business acumen and
efficiency; and great commercial success; and the problem of deter-
mining how far the initial combination contributed to the business
success attained, and whether its contribution was through legiti-
mate increase in efficiency or through ilegitimate suppression of
existing or possible competition, is full of complications.
Such were some of the elements in the problem presented to the
Supreme Court in United States v. United Shoe Machinery Co.
(1918) 38 Sup. Ct. 473. The questions involved were so largely
questions of fact that except as every actual decision gives concrete-
ness to establish rules of law, the case adds little to the legal
definition of the offenses denounced by the Sherman Act. The
decision in favor of the company does, however, further emphasize
some points which were tolerably clear before, as that neither
mere size nor the fact of getting most of the business constitutes
in itself an illegal monopoly. No doubt great size and wealth in
themselves give power that may be abused, but if- size and wealth
are attained by legitimate means, the law must be content to watch
for signs of abuse. On this point the conclusion of the majority of
the court is summed up as follows: "The company, indeed, has
magnitude, but it is at once the result and cause of efficiency, and
the charge that it has been oppressively used has not been sustained."
The Government charged a general scheme of monopoly to which
all the specific acts alleged were contributory and subordinate. These
acts were of three general classes: first, the combination in 1899 of
three or four companies manufacturing shoe machinery; second, the
subsequent acquisition of a large number of smaller businesses, patent
rights, etc., in the shoe machinery field; and third, the method of
doing business by which machines were leased under leases alleged
to contain oppressive clauses designed to extend and perpetuate
the monopoly.:
'The very complicated issues of fact involved in the sifting of these charges
had been considered with painstaking fullness by the three judges who tried
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With regard to the original combination, it appeared that the
machines the constituent companies were making were in general
non-competing, and that the chief result of the combination was to
give the United Company a more nearly complete line of shoe
machinery. That such a combination would involve no violation of
the Sherman Act was obvious, and had already been decided by the
Supreme Court in a criminal suit based on the same alleged
monopoly. The Government charged, however, that in respect to
one type of machine, nameiy lasting machines, there was competition
between two of the constitutent companies; and, in respect to welt-
sewing machines, between one of these and a third constituent com-
pany. Had these claims been fully sustained by the evidence, the
decision might have thrown some light on one of the many questions
of degree involved in the apilication of the general rule of the Sher-
man Act to particular cases. It appeared, however, that the alleged
competing machines were in general adapted to use on entirely differ-
ent types of shoes, though there was some speculative possibility that
by further improvement and adaptation they might have become more
fully competing. In one instance such improvement was later
made by the United Company. It is sufficient to say on this point
that the findings of the District Court, virtually adopted by the
Supreme Court, reduced the actual competition between the machines
in question at the time of the combination very nearly to the vanishing
point, and left only possibilities of future competitive development,
much too speculative to furnish a basis for dissolving a combina-
tion which had stood unchallenged for twelve years before the bill
was filed, and had long since practically superseded the original
machines by the improvements it had itself developed.
Similar findings disposed of the long line of subsequent acquisi-
tions, impressive in the mass, but losing most of their significance
when examined in detail. The most important, that of the Plant shoe
machinery patents, was complicated by mutual claims of patent
the case in the District Court, each of whom wrote a long opinion, con-
curring in the decision in favor of the defendants. United States v. United
Shoe Machinery Co. (19x5, D. Mass.)- = Fed. 349. The majority opinion
in the Supieme Court discusses some few portions of the evidence in some
detail, but rather by way of illustration than exhaustive consideration,
and in the main adopts and relies on the findings and conclusions of' the
lower court. Two of the three dissenting judges also wrote opinions but they
merely sumnarized certain portions of the evidence with the conclusions
drawn therefrom. For any statement of the evidence in sufficient detail to
judge of the merits of the conclusions, the opinions in the District Court must
be carefully studied, and even these could give only an incomplete summary,-
so great was the number and so complicated the details of the transactions
covered by the inquiry.
I United States v. Winslow (1913) 227 U. S. =02, 33 Sup. Ct 253.
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infringement, by pending and threatened litigation, and by the fact
that the Plant machinery, while ineffective and of little commercial
value as it stood, contained patented features which could be
developed as improvements to the United Company's machines, thus
producing more efficient machinery than either Plant or the United
Company could produce without the use of the other's patents.
If the difficulties which may arise on the facts in determining the
legality of a combination are considerable, the difficulties of determin-
ing when conduct other than combination becomes an unlawful
"attempt to monopolize" are still greater. Here it is perhaps even
more true that the methods of legitimate competition may closely
resemble the -methods of attempted monopoly. Again it must be
emiphasized that monopoly in a legal sense is not simply getting all
the business. Monopoly involves the idea of exclusion. "Monopoliz-
ing," in the absence of combination, means, within limits yet to be
clearly defined by statutes or decisions, the exercise of oppressive,
coercive or unfair means to exclude competitors from the market.
The principal claim of the Government in regard to the United Com-
pany's leases will serve as an illustration. The claim was that by
so-called "tying clauses" the lawful patent monopoly of certain
"essential" machines was used to force shoe manufacturers to take
also the United Company's auxiliary machines, with which otherwise
manufacturers of other lines of shoe machinery might successfully
have competed. If this claim had been sustained by the evidence it
would seem from the reasoning of previous decisions that a viola-
tion of the law might perhaps have been found.
5
But the facts were found not to support the charge. The whole
leasing system was attacked by the Government as merely an instru-
ment devised by the United Company to foster its monopoly. But
the lower court found, and the Supreme Court affirmed the finding,
that the leasing system was employed by the constituent companies
before the combination; that it had a sound economic basis and had
proved highly advantageous to shoe manufacturers and to the shoe
manufacturing industry, particularly in enabling the small shoe manu-
facturer to compete successfully with his larger rival; and that on
the whole the changes made by the United Company in the forms of
the leases had been in the direction of greater liberality rather than
less. The principal "tying clause" required the leased machine to be
used only in connection with certain other machines leased from the
'See especially Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co.
(1917) 243 U. S. 502, 37 Sup. Ct 416, discussed in (19,7) 26 YA.E LAw
JouAN,, 6o; and cf. Standard Sanitary Mfg. Co. v. United States (x912)
226 U. S. 20, 33 Sup. Ct. 9.
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United Company. On violation of this condition the United Com-
pany could cancel the lease. The Government's expert testified that
the Goodyear welter and stitcher were the only two "essential"
machines, and the District Court's finding was practically to the same
effect 8 Had these machines been leased only on condition that they
be used with other machines of the defendant, there would have been
strong ground for the Government's charge. It appeared, however,
that leases of these two machines had never contained that clause.
The lessees of the welter and stitcher were entirely free to use them
with any machinery of other manufacturers for performing other
operations. It was the subordinate machines that were restricted to
use with the Goodyear welter and stitcher. And even the sub-
ordinate machines were always obtainable on so-called unrestricted
leases, without the "tying clause," on the same royalty, but with the
addition of an initial payment.
What, then, was the reason for the "tying clause"? The royalties
were fixed at so much a pair of shoes. The welter and stitcher had
the largest royalties attached to them and had also recording devices
to determine the number of shoes operated upon, which greatly
simplified the difficult question of royalty accounting. The defendant
could therefore afford to lease its subordinate machines on better
terms to those who also used its welter and stitcher. There were
other business reasons for the arrangement. It appeared that the
efficiency of all the machines, and consequently their output and the
royalties earned, depended on the very careful adaptation of each
machine to use with the machines preceding and following it in the
process of shoe manufacture. Again the United Company gave an
inspection and repair service without additional charge, the cost
of which per machine would evidently be less in a factory where
many United machines were in use. These and other reasons were
sufficient to justify the company in making better terms for a full set
of machines than for individual machines. In fact most of the clauses
to which the Government objected finally came down either to the
question of a wholesale as against a retail rate, or to an inducement
to the shoe manufacturer to make the greatest possible use of the
machines leased, resulting in larger royalty earnings, and incidentally
making possible a lower royalty rate.
But arrangements like that condemned in the Motion Picture Co.
casey have something of the same element of a wholesale as against
a retail transaction, with the very important addition, however, that
in that case the vendor who sought to link two products together




refused to furnish them at all for separate use. But suppose that
a company engaged in furnishing machinery for electric power plants
refuses to take any contracts except for a complete installation. Is
such a course of business in violation of the Sherman Act? Does it
become so if the company has a lawful patent monopoly of one
machine entering into the installation, so superior that its desirability,
in connection with the policy described, furnishes a strong induce-
ment to go to that company for the entire installation? There are
difficult questions here, which future cases must answer. All we can
gather from the Shoe Machinery case is that if alternative terms are
offered for separate machines, and if there are legitimate business
reasons for the wholesale rate, and if the course of business as a
whole negatives the intent to make one or two superior machines a
lever to force the sale of the rest, the arrangement may be upheld.
While it gives us no final test for all cases, this seems a sound and
sensible result as far as it goes.
One clause in certain of the United Company's leases seems to have
been directly within the rule of the Motion Picture Co. case.8
Leases of "metallic machines" (for attaching to shoes certain metallic
fastenings) required the purchase of the fastening material from the
defendant in lieu of royalty. This clause is not discussed in the
opinion of the District Court, but is incidentally mentioned and might
be taken as inferentially approved by the Supreme Court opinion.
But too much weight can hardly be attached to this reference. The
bill alleged a monopoly or attempted monopoly of shoe machinery,
not of fastening material. If the clause in regard to metallic fasten-
ings tended to unlawful monopoly of anything, it was of fastening
material. It had therefore no tendency to support the charge in the
bill, unless on the theory of cumulative evidence of general monopo-
listic intent. It was doubtless in this light that the majority opinion
of the Supreme Court referred to it as a "mere make-weight" and
"not of special materiality." It is to be noted also that when the
case was tried in the lower court the Dick case, 9 since overruled by
the Motion Picture Co. case, still stood as law on the validity of such
conditions as that involved in the clause in question; and this is
probably a further reason why objections to that clause were not
pressed at the trial, or disciissed by the District Court
It may be possible, however, that we have not heard the last word
on the legality of such a condition; that in a given case legitimate
business reasons might be found to justify it, and take it out of the
prohibition imposed by the Motion Picture Co. case. It is certain
S Supra, note S.
'Henry v. A. B. Dick Co. (1912) 224 U. S. 1, 32 Sup. Ct 364.
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that we have not heard the last word on the shoe machinery leases.
The case just decided turned wholly on the Sherman Act, the suit
having been begun before the Clayton Act was passed. It is generally
understood that certain provisions of the Clayton Act were aimed
directly at the United Shoe Machinery Co. and its leases, though
possibly rather at what was supposed to be their purpose and effect
than at what the court in the Sherman Act case found these to be.
A federal suit against the company under the Clayton Act is now
pending in a different federal district from that in which the Sher-
man Act case was tried.10 The ultimate determination of the legality
of the leases under the present law must await the decision of that
case.
The case just decided, as has been said, turned almost wholly on
questions of fact."' Whether the conclusions of the District Court,
affirmed by the majority of the Supreme Court, on these questions of
fact, or those of the dissenting judges in the higher court, were
more nearly correct, only one who had read all the evidence could
reasonably undertake to judge. It may be said, however, as the
Supreme Court held, that every reasonable presumption should be
indulged in favor of the unanimous conclusion of the judges who sat
through the long trial, heard most of the testimony in open court,
and carefully read and sifted all the evidence. It should be said also
that their opinions are thorough, well-reasoned, and much more con-
vincing than the generalities of the dissenting opinions in the court
above, which seem rather to jump to conclusions. Considering the
popular impressions of the "Shoe Machinery Trust," the fondness
which the Department of Justice has very naturally displayed for such
shining marks, and the enormous labor involved in going carefully
into the multitudinous issues which such a prosecution raises, it is
rather reassuring to those who fear the tendencies of popular govern-
ment that the Supreme Court, which has heretofore found so uni-
formly for the Government in all the big trust prosecutions, should
have given this proof of its willingness to weigh each case on the
" See United States v. United Shoe Machinery Co. (igi6, E. D. Mo.) 234
Fed. 127, in which the defendant's motion to dismiss was denied,-a decision,
of course, purely on the sufficiency of the allegations of the bill, and pre-
liminary to the taking of evidence to support the allegations. How far the
findings in the Sherman Act case in regard to the intent and effect of
the lease clauses under attack may be held to be res adjudicata in the Clayton
Act suit is an interesting question.
"It is perhaps fortunate that the case turned largely on fact rather than
law; for it was in effect a minority decision. Justices McReynolds and
Brandeis, having been concerned as counsel at earlier stages of the case, took
no part in the decision, and the remaining seven judges divided four to three.
There might therefore have been some doubt of the ultimate authority of any
new law laid down.
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evidence and to discriminate where it finds judicial discrimination to
be warranted. The demonstration would of course be more impres-
sive had the result not been reached by so narrow a margin.
It must not be forgotten, in. judging the correctness of the decision,
that the ultimate result of the efficient competition which the law
seeks to foster may appear superficially much like the result of the
monopoly which it prohibits. A number of facts which appear to
have been established, such as the continual efforts of the United
Company to improve its product by constant experiment and large
expense, its policy of giving its customers the benefit of these
improvements without additional charge, the testimony of the
witnesses to the excellence of its service, the lack of any substantial
proof of unreasonable rates or charges, the repeated refusals to buy
competing businesses or patents, much more numerous than the
acquisitions actually made, the high level of efficiency constantly
maintained, and the fact that so far as competition with patented
machines is possible there has always been competition, tend strongly
to support the conclusion of the majority of the court that here was
a success established by distancing rather than by suppressing
competitors, and maintained only by unremitting effort for greater
efficiency in the face of actual or possible competition. In these days
when we are realizing as never before the value of industrial efficiency,
a decision that the law has no quarrel with success so obtained is
particularly timely.
TORT AND CONTRACT IN THE MARKETING OF FOOD
It was a dictum in New York which introduced into American law
the doctrine that in sales of foodstuffs a dealer always impliedly
warrants their fitness for consumption The question has just come
before the Court of Appeals for the first time, and the doctrine has
been squarely affirmed, in Race v. Krum (I918, N. Y.) ii8 N. E.
853.2 The plaintiff purchased and ate at the defendant's drug store
ice cream manufactured by the defendant In an action for damages
for illness caused by the presence in the cream of a filth product,
tyrotoxicon, the trial court charged that the defendant impliedly
warranted the cream wholesome and fit to eat. The instruction was
on appeal held correct.
'See Van Bracklin v. Fonda (i8r5, N. Y. Sup. Ct) 12 Johns. 468.
'Discussed (1918) 16 M cH. L. Rav. 555; the problem involved is also con-
sidered in (i9o8) I5 L. R. A. (N. S.) 884. The present comment deals wholly
with liability to the consumer of food intended for human beings. See also
(i94) 48 L. R. A. (N. S.) 213, 229; and on the more general relations of the
topic, ibid. 2r3, and (igog) ig ibid. 923.
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The court expressly distinguishes the case from that of an inn-
keeper or restaurateur. These latter have been held not to warrant
because they do not sell; they merely set before a guest food, to
which title does not pass, but which the guest in return for his money
receives the privilege of consuming on the spot so far as he desires
to.8 On the soundness of this doctrine the court refuses to pass; in
the instant case, it finds a clear sale. Yet it is hard to see wherein
the serving of ice cream over the counter of a drug store
differs in this respect from the serving of ham and eggs at a lunch
counter. But without further regard to whether or not such cases
do in fact and general understanding constitute sales, it is submitted
that the existence of an implied warranty need not be conditioned
on the existence of a strict sale. Implied warranties rest either on an
attempt to interpret the parties' true mutual understanding, or on
public policy; the warranty of wholesomeness of food belongs to the
latter class.4 The considerations of policy which attach that warranty
of wholesomeness to the sale of meat to a consumer in the market5
apply with equal force to the serving of meat to a guest in a hotel;
if anything, they are stronger, because the guest has less opportunity
than the ordinary purchaser in the market to discover defects in food
*'Ierrill v. Hodson (914) 88 Conn. 314, 91 AtI. 533, criticized (914) 24
YA.LE LAw JOuRNAL, 73, where two criminal cases are cited which held such
serving to be a sale. See also (917) 27 YALE LAw JouRNAL, 14o. What the
true relations of the parties are in such a case is something of a problem.
Certainly title does not necessarily pass to all the food; the guest may reject
part; it is part of the contract that the innkeeper will dispose of all the guest
may leave. But suppose the latter desires to take some of the food to his
room to eat later-fruit, for example. Or suppose a pearl is found by the guest
in oysters served on the half-shell. It has been suggested that the situation
may be different in a hotel dining room or conventional restaurant on the one
hand, and in a self-serve dairy-lunch on the other; or even different according
to whether service is table d'hlte or a la carte. Cf. Valeri v. Pullman Co.
(8914, S. D. N. Y.) 218 Fed. 519, 521; but cf. also the seeming facts in Leahy
v. Essex Co. (1914, N. Y.) 164 App. Div. 9o3, 148 N. Y. Supp. io63. Perhaps
there might also be a difference as to kinds of food. The test may well be
found in an attempt by the server of food to revoke and retake possession
before the food is consumed.
"'The consequences resulting from the purchase of an unsound article may
. . prove so disastrous to the health and life of the consumer," etc. "The
vendor has so many more facilities for ascertaining the soundness," etc.
Wiedeman v. Keller (898) 171 Ill. 93, 99, 49 N. E. 210, 211. Cf. on the
related question of the public policy back of criminal regulation of sales of
food (i916) 26 YALE LAW JouRNAL, 67; and (1917) ibid. 416; also (I918) 27
ibid. 961; and see a suggestive discussion by Hand, J., in Valeri v. Pullman
Co., .supra.
'Rinaldi v. Mohican Co. (igi6, N. Y.) 171 App. Div. 814, 857 N. Y. Supp.
s6i (warranty of retailer) ; Catani v. Swift and Co. (1915) 251 Pa. 52, 95 Atl.




set before him. Why cannot the warranty be attached to the sale
of a privilege of consuming food as well as to the sale of the food
itself ?
The common law history of this warranty doctrine, indeed, is almost
wholly one of extension. It is based, ultimately, on a statement in
Blackstone that "in contracts for provisions, it is always implied that
they are wholesome." 7  But Blackstone's exception to caveat emptor
rested in no wise on warranty, but on ancient criminal statutes ;8 the
predication on it of the warranty doctrine, by a multitude of dicta,'
and then by decided cases,'0 seems a case of growth by mistake."
Mistake or no, however, it is established law to-day, and the principal
case, resting on it, reaches a sound result 1 2
For all that, the doctrine of warranty is not sufficient unto the needs
it has been called upon to fill. For while a warranty protects only
those "privy" to it,' the public policy on which the warranty rests
demands protection of all consumers of foodstuffs. There have been
heroic attempts to make the means meet the situation; it has been
' The meaning of such a transaction seems to be that the innkeeper, for a
money or credit consideration, extinguishes in himself certain rights in the
food and creates in the guest certain others; the essential relation involved
is a privilege in the guest to consume the food-a privilege which, though
perhaps not transferable, is almost as valuable as the complete ownership.
This may fairly be called a sale of a portion of the title to the food; for sale
of the whole title, i. e., of the food, is only the same operation applied to all
the legal relations of which that title is made up.73 BI. Comm. *165.
'Benjamin, Sales (7th ed.) see. 672; Williston, Sales, sec. 241; Burnby v.
Bollett .(1847, Exch.) 16 M. & W. 644.
'2 Mechem, Sales, sec. 1356; 11 R. C. L. ui2o; 15 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law (2d
ed.) 1238; and cases cited.
"0Hoover v. Peters (I869) x8 Mich. 5i; Sinclair v. Hathaway (1885) 57
Mich. 6o; Wiedeman v. Keller, supra, n. 4; Sloane v. Woolworth Co. (ig96)
193 Ill. App. 62o. In citing these cases it is not always noticed that those in
Illinois were decided under a statute similar to that Blackstone had in mind.
See Wiedeman v. Keller, supra, at p. 99. Indeed the whole matter is frequently
regulated by statute. See Catani v. Swift and Co., supra, n. 5, at p. 56;
Flessher v. Carstens Packing Co. (igi6) 93 Wash. 48, 53; i6o Pac. r4, 16;
and see note x2, infra.
'See citations supra, n. 8.
'It is something of a question, however, how far the Sales Act-which,
although adopted in New York, is not discussed by the court in the principal
case-should be held to have changed this common law rule. The English
Sales of Goods Act brings the sale of an article of food, as to implied warranty,
within the ordinary rule of reasonable reliance applied to sales of goods
generally. x5 Hals. Laws Eng. 3; Frost v. Aylesbury Dairy Co. (C A.) [19o5]
i K. B. 6o8. And the provisions of the American Uniform Sales Act are taken
from the English Act. Williston, Sales, sec. 248.
1 See Ketterer v. Armour & Co. (i912, S. D. N. Y.) 2o Fed. 322, 323, for




said that "a manufacturer, dealer, or other person may bring himself
into privity with others under exceptional circumstances, and thereby
be charged with a duty toward such person different or greater
than that which he owes to" persons in general ;" the "special circum-
stances" come down largely to knowledge that certain other persons
were intended by the buyer to use the commodity bought,' 5-to a
groping part-application of a sort of third party beneficiary rule. No
theoretical difficulty appears, indeed, in recognizing warranties for the
benefit of third persons ;16 but there is the practical question whether
the courts would consciously accept such a doctrine, and just how far
they would carry it if they did.
The idea of liability in tort seems simpler and more apt: that
every manufacturer and dealer in foodstuffs is under a common law
duty to any person who may reasonably be expected subsequently to
use those foodstuffs, to use reasonable care to make and keep them
wholesome."' And so it is very generally held: drugs, and then food,
"Hasbrouck v. Armour & Co. (igog) 139 Wis. 357, 363; 12, N. W. I57,
i6o. This case follows an excellent discussion of the principles involved in
food and other cases with the remarkable finding of fact that injury to the hand
of a consumer was not a consequence to be expected from allowing a needle
to become imbedded and hidden in a cake of soap. Attempts to follow the
court in its application of theory to facts have led to regrettable results. See
(1917) 27 YALE LAW JouRNAL, 281, criticizing Jacobs v. Childs Co. (1917, Mun.
Ct.) x66 N. Y. Supp, 798 (nail in cake).
2 So Woodward v. Miller (19o4) ii9 Ga. 618, 46 S. E. 847, where the defen-
dant manufacturer sold a buggy he knew to be defective to a municipal cor-
poration for the use of one of its employees; and the Hasbroick case, supra,
so explains Bishop v. Weber (i885) 139 Mass. 411, I N. E. x54, where a caterer
was employed to furnish dinner to a man and his guests; but a later Massa-
chusetts case finds that "there seems to be ground for holding that the declara-
tion in Bishop v. Weber was good as a declaration on a contract between the
plaintiff and the defendant." Farrell v. Manhattan Mkt. Co. (i9o8) i98 Mass.
271, 286; 84 N. F_ 481, 487. The actual writ in the Bishop case covered both
tort and contract; the decision was only that the action lay.
"There seems no reason to question that a warranty may to-day be treated
as a contract, whether or no it took its origin in tort. Cf. Naih v. Minnesota
Title Ins. & T. Co. (i895) 163 Mass. 574, 40 N. E. io39.
"Ketterer v. Armour & Co., supra, n. 13; and see Flessher v. Carstens
Packing Co., supra, n. io, at p. 56; Parks v. Yosf Pie Co. (1914) 93 Kan. 334,
337; 144 Pac. 202, 203; Doyle v. Fuerst and Kraemer (i911) 129 La. 838, 84r;
s6 So. 9o6, 907; Ketterer v. Armour & Co. (1917, C. C. A. 2d) 247 Fed. 921,
927. On what difference there may be betweeir the liability of the manufac-
turer and that of the seller, see note 20, infra.
The benefit of this liability in tort extends to the members of the household
of the purchaser of food or drink. See Ketterer v. Armour & Co. (C. C A.
2d) supra, n. 17, at p. 923- It extends to a casual licensee or guest. Watson v.
Augusta Brewing Co. (i9o5) 124 Ga. 121, 52- S. E. I52. It would seem, there-
fore to cover almost any consumer; but it would probably not be extended to
benefit a thief, and possibly not a finder. Liability to one who buys to resell is
of course a wholly different question, itself not free from conflict of authority.
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have been brought under the ordinary rule of torts as to dangerous
instruments.1 s The test of reasonable care serves also to avoid
another difficulty of the warranty doctrine at which some courts have
balked:"9 that it is absolute. It seems hard, for instance, to hold a
retail dealer for damage caused by meat of good appearance, which
he chose and kept carefully, and which bore the government stamp.2 0
Compare Neiman v. Channellene Oil & Mfg. Co. (igio) 1i2 Minn. zI, 127 N. W.
394; Mazetti v. Armour & Co. (x9x3) 75 Wash. 622, 135 Pac. 633; and the
rule as stated in i5 L. R. A. (N. S.) 884.
2s (1916) 25 YAix LAw Jou-xmAiM 679; see also, on the general duty of a
manufacturer (xgi8) 27 ibid. 96x; but see Farrell v. Manhattan Mkt. Co.,
supra, n. 15, at p. 286.
"9Bigelow v. Maine Central R. Co. (1912) 1io Maine, 105, 85 At. 396,
where it was said that with the changed conditions of modern industry, public
policy might no longer impose upon caterer, seller or host the old implied
warranty of wholesomeness; that with canned goods, as with other packed
and branded food sold in the package, vendor and vendee rely equally on the
brand, with no greater opportunity in the former to know the quality of the
goods, unless their history or appearance put him on notice. This view as to
canned goods appears to be finding approval. See Flessher v. Carstens Pack-
ing Co., supra, n. io, at p. 54; but see Chapman v. Roggenkamp (1913) 182
IlL App. iI7.
'As in the Illinois cases, and as in Rinaldi v. Mohican Co., supra, n. 5, despite
misgivings. Courts often comment on the severity of the rule, but seem to
feel that its general working is nevertheless salutary. If so, the benefits must
be found, as with the statute of frauds,- not in the litigated cases, but in the
regulation of conduct to prevent the question arising.
In the Rinaldi case, in Sheffer v. Willoughby (1896) 163 Ill. 518, 45 N. .
253, in the principal case, and often elsewhere, the rule of warranty is phrased
to apply to a dealer who makes or prepares the article he sells; who is, there-
fore, a manufacturer; and again, to a sale for immediate use. If the latter
qualification is intended to exclude liability for the spoiling of goods in the
hands of the consumer, its presence is unnecessary; if it is intended to exclude
the vendee's purchaser, it is again unnecessary in most instances, as the warranty
is rarely-save where the original package rule (note ig, supra) is applied
to exonerate the dealer-held to enure to the sub-vendee's benefit The word
"consumption" substituted for "immediate use" would be more accurate and
less likely to mislead.
The restriction of the warranty to a sale by a manufacturer, it will be noticed,
is not in consonance with the passage from Blackstone as read by the courts;
it appears to rest on the thought that the opportunity to discover defects which
is available to a dealer who does not prepare his food is not enough better
than that of his patrons to justify the imposition of any warranty. This hardly
holds true in fact. It is submitted that, subject always to the limitation pointed
out in note xg, dealer and manufacturer should be on one footing as to warranty
of food-as they are in other warranties under sec. I5 (I) of the Sales Act.
The tort obligation likewise would appear to rest on manufacturer and dealer
alike. It may seem proper in many cases to hold the manufacturer rather more
strictly to account than the dealer; the nicer definition of the standard of care
must be left to each court on the facts of each case. Cf. note 21, infra. Of
course a merely casual vendor will rarely be held on either theory. See Burnby
v. Bollett, supra, n. 8; Williston, Sales, see. 242; but see Hoover v. Peters
(x869) x8 Mich. 31.
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On this point of policy, however, the courts are not agreed;21 many
even of those cases which go off on the tort theory tend to place upon
the seller-particularly if he be also the manufacturer-not a mere
duty to use due care, but the liability of an insurer of the food sold ;22
a liability even broader than that under the implied warranty, because
it extends to any person who may use the food.
The advantages of the tort doctrine, then, over that of implied
warranty, are that it is no anomaly, but fits into the general law of
the subject; that without danger of uncertainty or mistake it pro-
tects all those whom the public policy on which it rests is intended to
protect; and-if this be an advantage-that it may easily be applied
to impose a duty, not absolute, but tempered by reason.
But between the two theories there is no conflict. If a single one
had to be chosen, certainly that of tort would be preferable; but there
is no cause to choose a single one.2 3  When a man ships goods by a
common carrier, relations result which may impose liabilities not only
in contract, but in tort as well. If a man under contract to repair
something of mine makes a botch of it, he is liable not only in con-
"'Even in the cases which rest recovery on negligence the varying strictness
of the requirements of proof leads to widely differing results. Some hold that
the negligence must expressly be averred and proved. Sheffer v. Willoughby,
supra, n. 2o. Or that evidence tending to show that the plaintiff bought and ate
food at the lunch room of the defendant, and had ptomaine poisoning in con-
sequence, was not sufficient to enable the plaintiff to go to the jury on the
question of negligence. Crocker v. Baltimore Lunch Co. (1913) 214 Mass. 177,
ioo N. E. io78; see also Ketterer v. Armour & Co. (C. C. A. zd) supra, n. 17.
Certainly the more liberal view in this matter is te preferable. So Tomlinson
v. Armour & Co. (i9o8, Ct. Err.) 75 N. J. L 748, 70 At. 314; Watson v.
Augusta Brewing Co., supra, n. 17; Doyle v. Fuersi. & Kraemer, supra, n. 17.
But it should be noted that this very liberalization of procedure can be made
to mean holding the defendant as an insurer. Cf. the cases in the following
note. The Massachusetts rule appears to be peculiar unto itself: "As due
care is no defence when the dealer makes the selection, so there is no liability
for negligence when a dealer offers several articles of food for sale from
which the buyer is to make his own selection. In offering . . . he impliedly
represents that he believes all of them to be fit for food. That is the extent
of his liability." Farrell v. Manhattan Mkt. Co., supra, n. 15, at p. 2W6. It is
believed that the test of selection is not satisfactory, unless perhaps for warranty
alone; as to which it might be justified as an application of the Sales Act. Cf.
note I2, supra.
n Parks v. Yost Pie Co., supra, n. 17; Catani v. Swift and Co., supra, n. 5;
Jackson Coca Cola Bottling Co. v. Chapman (914) io6 Miss. 864, 64 So. 791;
but see Crigger v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. (915) 132 Tenn. 545, 179 S. W. 155.
= The possibility of recovery on either of two theories in cases where, for
instance, a dealer himself prepares food and sells it to an immediate consumer,
is often recognized and discussed by the courts; which at times-particularly
when refusing recovery-distinguish sharply between the two. See Crocker v.
Baltimore Lunch Co., supra, n. 21; Hasbrouck v. Armour and Co., supra, n.
14; and see also Tomlinson v. Armour and Co., supra, n. 21. On the other
hand, some courts would merge the theories. See Flessher v. Carstens Pack-




tract for failure properly to perform, but in tort for misdoing.2' And
so in the situation under discussion, there may well be two liabilities,
each with its own content That New York has chosen to affirm the
doctrine of implied warranty of wholesomeness is no cause for
reproach-if only she does not for that reason disaffirm the rule of
liability in tort.
FOREIGN CORPORATION TAXES "D INTERSTATE COMMERCE
The decision of the Supreme Court in the recent case of Inter-
national Paper Company v. Massachsetts (x!18) 38 Sup. Ct. 292,.is
of importance in that it reaffirms in the broadest language the doctrine
laid down in the earlier case of Western Union Telegraph Company
v. Kansas,' which there was reason to think had been considerably
narrowed by later cases.
It will be remembered that in the Western Union case the court
decided that a license fee imposed upon a foreign corporation for the
privilege of doing local business and based upon a given per cent of
its entire authorized capital was unconstitutional. It held that such
a fee was necessarily "a burden and tax on the company's interstate
business.... Such is the necessary effect of the statute, and that
result cannot be avoided or concealed by calling the exaction of such
a per cent-of its capital stock a 'fee' for the privilege of doing local
business."
The Western Union was a corporation engaged in interstate com-
merce, and its interstate business was so intimately connected with
its intrastate business that they could not be separated as an economi-
cally sound business proposition.
Later decisions of the court, upholding statutes differing somewhat
from that in question in the Western Union case were thought to
limit the broad doctrine laid down in that case? This was particularly
true of the case of Baltic Mining Company v. Massachusetts." In
that case the court held constitutional a tax which was imposed for
the privilege of doing local business and based upon the total
authorized capital, but with a maximum limit of $2ooo. This act
had been construed as not applying to corporations whose sole busi-
ness was interstate commerce or which carried on interstate and intra-
state business in such close connection that the intrastate business
could not be abandoned without serious impairment of the interstate
business of the corporation.' The Baltic Mining Company was
(1917) 20 YA= LAw Joui-AL, 486.
I (izgo) 216 U. S. x, 3o Sup. CL. 19o.
See cases cited in the principal case.
£ (1913) 231 U. S. 68, 34 Sup. Ct I.S.
4See Baltic Mining Co. v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts (i911) 207
Mass. 38r, 93 N. E. 83r, at end of opinion.
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described as carrying on "a purely local and domestic business quite
separate from its interstate transactions." Contrasting this state of
facts with the situation in the Western Union case, and holding that
"Every case involving the validity of a tax must be decided upon its
own facts," the court came to the conclusion that in the Baltic Mining
Co. case the authorized capital was used in truth only as the measure
of a tax, in itself lawful, without the necessary effect of burdening
interstate commerce.
This language led constitutional lawyers to believe that the-doctrine
of the Western Union case would not be applied where the tax,
though based upon total authorized capital, was laid upon and made
the condition of doing a purely intrastate business, economically
separable from interstate business.
The decision in the International Paper Company case, however,
upsets this belief and reaffirms the broad language of the Western
Union case. The statute, as construed by the court, was identical
with that in the Baltic Mining Co. case, except that the maximum
limift had been removed. The court now makes no mention of the
fact that the intrastate and interstate business are separable, but lays
down the broad rule that no excise tax, based upon total authorized
capital, without maximum limit, may be laid upon a foreign corpora-
tion for the privilege of doing local business. It is apparent therefore
that the separability of local and interstate business no longer enters
into the question, and that the earlier decision in the Baltic Mining Co.
case must stand wholly on the maximum limit.
The reason for this distinction seems unsatisfactory, since to the
small corporation which does not receive the benefit of the limited
maximum the tax under either statute equally affects its interstate
commerce. Possibly the distinction may be justified on the ground
that where there is no maximum the intention is evident to measure
the tax by the whole business capital, both interstate and intrastate,
which necessarily in every case means that the tax is greater if inter-
state commerce is greater, thus burdening interstate commerce, while
where there is a reasonable maximum this intention is not manifest
and the fact that it may burden interstate commerce in the case of
small corporations is incidental only and not the intended effect of the
statute. Hence the statute may be upheld as being a local regulation
which merely incidentally affects interstate commerce, as has fre-
quently been held of police regulations. This explanation, however,
is not wholly satisfactory and it is to be hoped that the court will see
fit more clearly to enunciate the grounds of its decision in future
casesO W. W. G.
'For a full discussion of these cases see a series of articles (not yet com-
pleted) on "Indirect Encroachment on Federal Authority by the Taxing
Powers of the State" by Thomas Reed Powell, in (1918) 31 HARv. L. REv. 321,
572, 72r, 932
1075
